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Abstract 
In current academic psychology, scholars typically develop their research and ideas by 
drawing on the work of other contemporary and preceding psychological scientists and by 
following certain conventions of the field.  I refer to this variant of psychology as connected 
because the emphasis is on connecting various research findings and ideas generated by 
different scholars (e.g. by showing how they are related to each other via referencing).  In this 
article, I argue that, although connected psychology advances psychological knowledge, it 
restricts the total amount of knowledge that could eventually be produced and therefore limits 
the potential of the discipline to improve the understanding of psychological phenomena.  As 
a solution, I propose that, alongside the currently existing connected psychology, 
disconnected psychology should be established.  In disconnected psychology, researchers 
develop their ideas by following the main principles of psychological method, but they are 
disconnected from a “field” consisting of other psychologists and therefore do not follow the 
discipline’s norms and conventions.  By drawing on one of the core constructs from 
information theory—information entropy—I argue that combining the two streams of 
psychology would result in the most significant advancement of psychological knowledge.  
Keywords: Knowledge, psychology, information, entropy, method 
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Unburdening the Shoulders of Giants:  
A Quest for Disconnected Academic Psychology 
The fundamental aim of psychology is to increase psychological knowledge (i.e. the 
understanding of human mind and behavior).  Whereas this objective is typically implicitly 
understood by psychological scientists and evident from numerous publications belonging to 
the discipline without having to be openly stated, various professional organizations that 
represent psychological scientists, such as the British Psychological Society (BPS) or the 
American Psychological Association (APA), have articulated it in their definitions of 
psychology.1  In this article, I propose a fundamental obstacle that limits psychological 
knowledge and I develop a solution to overcome this obstacle.  I start the article by proposing 
how psychological knowledge can be expressed using quantitative language and then argue 
that the current academic psychology—to which I refer as connected psychology—restricts 
the quantity of psychological knowledge that could potentially be produced.  I then formulate 
the concept of disconnected psychology and argue that psychological knowledge can be 
maximized through the interaction of connected and disconnected psychology.   
What is “Knowledge” in the Context of Psychological Science? 
Various philosophers across many different traditions have attempted to define 
knowledge (Audi, 2011; Lehrer, 2018).  In the realm of philosophy of science, one of the 
most influential ideas in this regard has been laid out by Popper (1959, 1963), according to 
whom scientific knowledge is not merely the accumulation of observations.  Instead, it 
constitutes “the repeated overthrow of scientific theories and their replacement by better or 
more satisfactory ones” (Popper, 1963, p. 215).  On the opposite side of the spectrum, 
Feyerabend (1975) proposed that science is an anarchistic enterprise, which means that it 
does not involve a series of theories that gradually replace each other.  Instead, scientific 
knowledge is an “increasing ocean of mutually incompatible alternatives” (Feyerabend, 1975, 
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p. 21), where different theories compete against each other and thereby constantly force each 
other into greater articulation.  As exemplified by these two contrasting views, there is no 
consensus among philosophers concerning what knowledge is (Lehrer, 2018).  Therefore, in 
the present article, my aim is not to follow a particular philosophical definition but to propose 
a functional definition that describes how psychology currently operates as a field and that 
can also be expressed quantitatively.   
I posit that psychological knowledge can be defined as a reduction of uncertainty 
regarding the occurrence of phenomena of interest to psychology—mental states and 
behaviors.  Using psychological terminology, we can conceptualize these phenomena as 
dependent variables (DVs, i.e. measurable behaviors such as eating, discrimination, 
socialization, etc. and measurable mental states such as attitudes, intentions, affect, etc.).  
This definition can be extrapolated from sources where psychological knowledge is typically 
documented (e.g. journal articles, books, conference proceedings, etc.) that can be broadly 
divided into empirical (e.g. journals such as Psychological Science) and theoretical (e.g. 
journals such as Psychological Review).   
For example, in case of a typical research project that may be published in an empirical 
journal, the overarching goal is to investigate whether one or more independent variables 
(IVs) influence or predict DVs of interest.  Researchers may decide on which IVs to test 
based on previous literature and their own experiences or observations.  However, regardless 
of how well informed the selection of the IVs is, it remains uncertain whether they do in fact 
influence or predict the DVs of interest until research has been conducted to test this and the 
appropriate statistical analyses implemented.  Research then to some degree resolves the 
uncertainty regarding the occurrence of the phenomena studied because it clarifies whether 
and to what extent the IVs tested influence or predict the occurrence of these phenomena.  No 
study can, of course, provide a definite answer in this regard, but conducting multiple studies 
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and their replications can increase the confidence regarding the existence (or absence) of 
meaningful IV-DV links (Brandt et al., 2014; Hagger et al., 2016; Koole & Lakens, 2012; 
Simons, 2014; Verhagen & Wagenmakers, 2014).   
Whereas empirical publications reduce uncertainty regarding specific IV-DV links they 
test, the aim of a typical theoretical publication is to reduce uncertainty regarding whether 
and how different empirical findings are linked to each other by proposing an underlying 
principle that connects them.  A theory can be developed deductively, by formulating a set of 
principles based on a large body of available empirical findings and specifying testable 
predictions stemming from these principles, inductively, by starting with a core set of 
principles based on one or few empirical findings and then testing whether these principles 
apply “universally” across many different phenomena and settings, or abductively, by 
forming a best explanation about a phenomenon based on one’s own incomplete observations 
of the world and the limited empirical evidence that exists (Fann, 1970; Locke, 2007, 2015; 
Locke & Latham, 2002; Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019; Seth, 2015).  Regardless of the 
process through which a theory is developed, it must eventually connect many empirical 
publications via an underlying set of principles that reduce uncertainty regarding when and 
why the phenomena studied in these publications occur.  For example, in construal level 
theory, Trope and Liberman (2010) argue that, by understanding psychological distance (i.e. 
distance in terms of time, space, probability, or social connectedness) of a stimulus (e.g. an 
event, object, or person) it is possible to understand whether and to what degree certain 
mental states (e.g. attitudes, affect, etc.) or behaviors (e.g. prejudice, politeness, self-control, 
etc.) regarding this stimulus will occur.  The theory explains a range of findings from many 
empirical publications and also makes new testable predictions.  
To further clarify psychological knowledge, it is necessary to outline how theoretical 
and empirical sources interact to resolve uncertainty regarding the occurrence of 
UNBURDENING THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS 6 
 
psychological phenomena.  The field does not function in a strict Popperian way, according 
to which psychological scientists would comprehensively test one or more overarching 
theories empirically and then gradually replace them by better and more satisfactory theories 
(Locke, 2007, 2015; Muthukrishna & Henrich, 2019).  Instead, it is characterized by a more 
“anarchistic” set of practices: Although in some cases empirical publications are guided by 
well-developed theories such as the cognitive dissonance (e.g. Matz & Wood, 2005) or self-
affirmation theory (e.g. Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel, 2006), in many cases 
researchers eclectically combine insights from various articles and their own experiences to 
form “hodgepodge” theories that inform their research.   
In this regard, whereas individual empirical articles may reduce uncertainty regarding 
the specific IV-DV links tested, the accumulation of a large body of empirical articles may 
increase uncertainty regarding psychological phenomena on a macro level because it is not 
clear how all these articles are related and which overarching set of rules they provide 
regarding the occurrence of these phenomena.  Theoretical publications may then attempt to 
reduce this uncertainty by proposing some underlying principle that links the empirical 
findings and that can spawn new testable predictions.  This description of psychological 
knowledge is broadly consistent with certain propositions by both Kuhn (1962) and 
Feyerabend (1975).  In line with Kuhn (1962), it indicates that psychology is characterized by 
a constant increase and reduction of uncertainty.  However, in contemporary psychology, this 
process does not occur via a constant replacement of paradigms (i.e. sets of key theories, 
methodologies, and metaphysical assumptions) such as behaviorism (Liu & Liu, 1997) by 
periods of turmoil that are followed by new paradigms.  Instead, it is more dynamic and 
resembles a “sea” of different findings and approaches that, depending on their domain, may 
draw on each other and/or compete and in some cases be reconciled via rigorous review and 
theoretical articles but more frequently via eclectic referencing and argumentation 
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(Feyerabend, 1975).  Ultimately, in an ideal future, this dynamic cycle of interactions 
between theory and research would end in a unified theory that would explain the occurrence 
of all mental states and behaviors.  Even if such theories have been proposed (Henriques, 
2003; 2011), they have not come close to accomplishing this objective.  
Although I define psychological knowledge as uncertainty reduction and argue how it 
operates, it needs to be clear how uncertainty reduction must occur in order to count as 
psychological knowledge.  Indeed, stating that psychology aims to reduce uncertainty 
regarding the occurrence of psychological phenomena is not specific enough because the 
uncertainty reduction principle is evident in many different domains of human functioning.  
For example, it is possible to argue that religion aims to reduce uncertainty regarding 
different events happening in the world by producing a set of beliefs that can explain these 
events in relation to one or more gods (Hirsh, Mar, & Peterson, 2012; Hogg, Adelman, & 
Blagg, 2010).  This need to reduce uncertainty in many different domains may in fact reflect 
one of the core principles of the human brain (Friston, 2009, 2010).  What separates science 
more generally, and psychology more specifically, from other domains is that uncertainty 
needs to be reduced via some kind of scientific method to count as knowledge (Feyerabend, 
1975; Koch, 1981; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989). 
Broadly speaking, psychological method can be described as a sum of research designs 
and statistical techniques that have evolved throughout the existence of the field.  Many 
arguments that psychological scientists have had concerning the validity of and preference for 
different kinds of research designs and statistical techniques (e.g. Benjamin et al., 2018; Held 
& Ott, 2018; Koch, 1981; Loftus, 1996; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989; Wagenmakers, Wetzels, 
Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012) indicate that psychological method is far from 
being objective, and one “ideal” method that defines the field does not exist.  However, it is 
possible to identify two general characteristics of psychological method (Cohen, 1977; 
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Popper, 1959, 1963; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989; Shrout & Rodgers, 2018): 1) it requires that 
any claims that psychological scientists make regarding the occurrence of behaviors or 
mental states need to be validated via observation in the physical world, which implies that 
these behaviors or mental states need to be measurable; and 2) it requires justifying that the 
occurrence of behaviors or mental states under a specific set of circumstances (e.g. under the 
presence of certain IVs) is not a mere chance and would to some extent repeat whenever 
these circumstances are present.  In other words, psychology can reduce uncertainty 
regarding the occurrence of some behaviors or mental states only if it can observe them in the 
physical world and show that the instances when they occurred via observation were unlikely 
to happen coincidentally, due to chance.  Throughout this article, I will refer to the first 
characteristic of psychological method as observability, and to the second characteristic as 
non-accidentality.  Overall, for any idea expressed in a psychological publication to become 
part of psychological knowledge, it needs to be eventually supported by psychological 
method. 
Expressing Psychological Knowledge through Information Entropy 
To argue why current academic psychology fails to maximize the quantity of 
psychological knowledge produced, it is necessary to express this knowledge in a more 
precise, quantifiable manner.  For this purpose, I will use a concept from information 
theory—Shannon’s (1948) information entropy—that quantifies uncertainty and has already 
been implemented in relation to psychological phenomena and knowledge more broadly 
(Dretske, 1981, 1983; Fanelli, 2019; Hirsh et al., 2012).  Information entropy (H) can be 
expressed using the following equation: 𝐻 = −∑ 𝑝(𝑥𝑖)𝑙𝑜𝑔2𝑝(𝑥𝑖)𝑛𝑖=1   (1) 
In Equation 1, x refers to a variable consisting of any events, outcomes, or more 
generally possibilities ranging from {x1,…,xn}.  For example, in information theory, x would 
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typically refer to a string of numbers, whereas in psychology it has previously been used to 
denote a set of different behaviors that a person may consider in a given situation, such as 
walking, running, talking to someone, purchasing a food item, etc. (Hirsh et al., 2012).  The 
expression p(xi) denotes the probability of a given event belonging to x.  For example, if x 
refers to different behavioral possibilities that a person may consider in a situation, p(xi) 
corresponds to the probability that this person will undertake one of these behaviors.  Let us 
assume that the person is deciding among five different behaviors.  If s/he is highly uncertain 
and does not know which behavior to undertake, the probabilities of each of the five 
behaviors will be the same (0.20).  However, if the person is highly certain of which behavior 
to undertake, that behavior may for example have a high probability of 0.92, whereas each of 
the remaining four behaviors may have a probability of 0.02.  If we now calculate 
information entropy for the high (vs. low) uncertainty situation, we will see that it 
corresponds to 2.32 (vs. 0.56).  Higher information entropy therefore indicates higher 
uncertainty and the units in which it is expressed are called bits.  
Let us first use the concept of information of entropy to define what it means to 
produce knowledge more generally before focusing on psychological knowledge more 
specifically.  If knowledge corresponds to uncertainty reduction, then the amount of 
uncertainty prior to some knowledge-producing event (what counts as a knowledge-
producing event will depend on the domain of human functioning in question; e.g. 
psychology, religion, art, etc.), to which I will refer as entropy prior (Hp), needs to be larger 
than the amount of uncertainty after this event, to which I will refer as entropy final (Hf): Hp 
> Hf.  If this condition has been met, the amount of knowledge produced (K) can be expressed 
via the following equation.    
K = Hp - Hf     (2) 
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From Equation 2, we can see that the largest possible amount of knowledge is produced 
when Hp is as large as possible and Hf is as small as possible.  It is assumed that both Hp and 
Hf contain exactly the same instances of x ranging from {x1,…,xn}.  However, in Hf these 
instances have different probabilities than in Hp due to some knowledge-producing event that 
changed them.  The magnitude of Hf depends on the degree to which a knowledge-producing 
event that preceded it increased the probability of one specific instance of x while decreasing 
the probability of other instances (see Equation 1); the smallest possible value of Hf is 0, 
which indicates complete absence of uncertainty (i.e. some xi has a probability of 1).  
Therefore, for Hf to be small, it needs to contain some xi that has a high probability relative to 
all other instances of x, assuming that the knowledge-producing event can effectively 
demonstrate that this is indeed the case.  In contrast, Hp is determined by the total number (n) 
of all instances of variable x that can range from {x1,…,xn}.  I will refer to this number as 
n(x).  Indeed, the higher n(x) for Hp, the higher the maximum possible magnitude of Hp.  The 
relationship between n(x) and maximum possible Hp can be seen in Figure 1.  To further 
clarify why n(x) is important for the quantity of knowledge produced (K), let us assume that 
we have some Hf that is always 0.  In this case, K will depend on the maximum possible Hp: 
when n(x) = 2 this value is 1, when n(x) = 3 this value is 1.585, when n(x) = 4 this value is 2, 
and so on (Figure 1).  Therefore, to maximize knowledge, it is not enough to identify xi that 
can result in a small Hf—it is also necessary to increase n(x).  
Given that Equation 2 is formulated in terms of the difference in entropy before and 
after some knowledge-producing event, it is informative to relate it to other similar 
conceptualizations.  Technically, this formulation can be linked to the degree of Bayesian 
belief updating in terms of the relative entropy or uncertainty between prior and posterior 
beliefs, which is a key quantity in many fields.  In the visual neurosciences, for example, this 
is known as Bayesian surprise (Itti & Baldi, 2009; Sun, Gomez, & Schmidhuber, 2011), 
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whereas in developmental robotics it is known as intrinsic motivation (Barto, Mirolli, & 
Baldassarre, 2013; Oudeyer & Kaplan, 2009).  This quantity can also be regarded as the 
information gain afforded by some data, given some prior beliefs or hypothesis space; in 
statistics, the best experiments maximize this quantity, which underwrites the principles of 
optimal Bayesian design (Lindley, 1956; MacKay, 1992).  The quantity is also an important 
part of active inference, where it is known as intrinsic or epistemic value (Friston et al., 2015; 
Moulin & Souchay, 2015). 
Now that I have explained Equation 2 and linked it to other similar formulations, I 
proceed with expressing psychological knowledge production in relation to K.  In this regard, 
a knowledge producing event is any event that has reduced uncertainty regarding the 
occurrence of psychological phenomena (i.e. behaviors and mental states) via an application 
of psychological method.  For example, this event can involve a single research study or a set 
of any number of research studies that investigate some psychological phenomenon and result 
in some Hf that is smaller than Hp.  Parameter x (see Equation 1) used to compute Hf and Hp 
corresponds to a set of different explanations of the phenomenon of interest (i.e. 
circumstances that may predict it or give rise to it) that have been tested.  This parameter can 
refer to many different constructs, depending on the nature of research and psychological 
method used.  For example, it can refer to a number of different mediation models (or any 
other statistical models) that need to be tested to determine which one offers the best 
explanation of how some group of variables are linked to a psychological phenomenon (DV); 
it can refer to a number of different theories (e.g. comprehensive theories that would be 
published in theoretical journals and/or “hodgepodge” theories that eclectically combine 
insights from various empirical and theoretical journals) that guided the selection of IVs 
across one or more studies that constitute the knowledge-producing event, etc.2   
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Considering that the number of methods and approaches in psychology is immense, 
parameter x can take many other forms and shapes and should not be limited to only few 
ones.  The only important criterion is that it involves different “explanations” of some 
phenomenon—because computing information entropy requires comparing different 
explanations, depending on how likely it is for each of these explanations that they are the 
best explanation of the phenomenon of interest.  In some instances, the probabilities for each 
element of x could potentially be estimated with a relatively high degree of accuracy, as 
would for example be the case for x that refers to a set of statistical models such as mediation 
(Hayes, 2018).  In other instances, depending on the psychological method used, the 
probabilities for each element of x would be rough estimates.  However, to discuss why 
current psychological science does not maximize the production of psychological knowledge, 
as I propose in the next section, exact computations are not necessary—it is sufficient to 
understand how K is limited by n(x) and other parameters I have previously tackled.  
Why Does Current Psychology Fail to Maximize Knowledge Production? 
I have argued that the amount of knowledge produced (K) is determined by Hf, whose 
magnitude depends on whether it contains some xi that has a high probability relative to all 
other xi (assuming that the knowledge-producing event can demonstrate this), and Hp, which 
depends on n(x).  In this section, I posit that current psychology fails to maximize the 
production of psychological knowledge both because it makes the discovery of some xi with 
highest possible probability less likely and because it restricts n(x).  
I first discuss why current psychology fails to maximize the likelihood of discovering 
some xi with the highest possible probability.  I have explained that parameter x which 
contains elements xi ranging from {x1,…,xn} broadly corresponds to a set of different 
“explanations” of some psychological phenomenon and can take many forms and shapes (e.g. 
a set of different theories regarding the phenomenon).  Let us say that some x (e.g. a set of 
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theories) consists of a large n(x) that corresponds to the number of all possible instances of x 
that can exist (e.g. all possible theories), and this x contains the best possible xi (e.g. a 
unifying theory, to which I will refer as xu) that can lead to Hf = 0.  We can never precisely 
know n(x), but for practical purposes we can say that it tends to infinity.  In this case, what 
would maximize the possibility of finding xu?  Ideally, one would try to randomly “sample” 
different xi from the entire distribution of x (similar to how psychologists may randomly 
sample participants from a population of interest to ensure a representative sample) rather 
than focusing on some very narrow subset of x and predominantly working on very few 
similar xi.  Practically speaking, this would correspond to trying to develop as many diverse 
theories that are substantially different from each other as possible, as many distinct 
methodological approaches as possible, etc., because this approach would maximize our 
chances to identify a theory or methodology that can lead to smallest Hf.  However, the field 
of psychology (this also applies to other sciences) currently operates in such a way that the 
focus is on a relatively narrow subset of x (when compared to all possibilities of x that could 
eventually exist) enforced by various conventions, trends, and politics pertaining to either the 
field more generally or to various research domains within the field (see Medin, Ojalehto, 
Marin, & Bang, 2017; Rozin, 2001, 2009), even if no objective indications that this subset in 
fact contains xu exist.   
This premise can be supported by arguments on many different levels.  For example, it 
has been acknowledged that APA style that psychologists widely rely on when writing 
psychological sources of knowledge is not just a set of explicit guidelines for presenting 
information (Budge & Katz, 1995; Madigan, Johnson, & Linton, 1995).  In fact, APA style is 
itself an epistemology that enforces certain values and beliefs regarding psychology as a 
discipline and reflects its conventions.  Moreover, the peer review process is also guided by 
various biases and epistemological beliefs of the reviewers and may therefore propel research 
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trajectories that are in line with these biases and beliefs (Blackburn & Hakel, 2006; Marsh, 
Jayasinghe, & Bond, 2008; Pier et al., 2018; Simon & Fyfe, 1994; Suls & Martin, 2009).  
Indeed, if psychology generally functions as other sciences, then it may be dominated by a 
group of highly influential psychological scientists who propel their own ideas and ideas of 
their collaborators but make it more difficult for other opposing or different ideas to enter the 
field, either directly or indirectly by creating conventions that are unfavorable to such ideas 
(Azoulay, Fons-Rosen, & Graff Zivin, 2019).  This empirically supported premise is 
famously known as Planck’s Principle (Hull, Tessner, & Diamond, 1978).  Finally, as 
proposed by Lakatos (1970), psychology may, similar to other sciences, contain various 
research programmes (i.e. sequences of theories that share some fundamental principles or 
assumptions) that shape research agendas of groups of psychologists, even if we 
acknowledge that not all psychologists operate according to the strict definition of research 
programmes.  For example, embodied cognition or evolutionary psychology can to some 
degree be considered research programmes.  
Another practice in psychology that impedes the discovery of xu by influencing 
psychologists to focus on a relatively narrow subset of x (e.g. theories and methods) is the 
referencing convention that it uses to connect different sources of psychological knowledge 
(i.e. journal articles, books, etc.).  In the early days of the discipline, before the onset of the 
information age spawned by technological advancements, psychologists were generally 
forced to work more independently because they did not have access to an extensive 
“knowledge” network consisting of many psychological sources (Leahey, 1987, 1994).  
Independently developing new methodologies, theories, approaches, etc. was therefore a 
necessity.  The advent of the Internet and the explosion of information led to a substantial 
increase in the number of citations per article that has been more drastic in psychology than 
in other sciences such as physics (Adair & Vohra, 2003; Sigal & Pettit, 2012).  Referencing is 
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undoubtedly useful when it comes to connecting various sources of psychological knowledge 
and understanding how theories, methodological approaches, and empirical findings are 
related.  However, it also forces psychologists to develop their ideas in relation to other 
published research and theories, to fill in “gaps” in the literature, or to work on research 
topics that are highly cited to increase their scientific reputation and/or chances of tenure (e.g. 
Anderson et al., 2019; Moher et al., 2018; Safer & Tang, 2009).  Overall, such practices 
decrease the likelihood of developing as many diverse theories, methodologies, and 
approaches that are substantially different from each other as possible.  
A similar argument can be used to posit that current psychology restricts n(x), thereby 
lowering Hp, given that various conventions, trends, and practices I have discussed (e.g. APA 
style and the associated epistemological beliefs, referencing, peer review process, impact of 
highly influential scientists on the discipline, research programmes, etc.) have negative 
consequence for the diversity of theories, methodologies, and approaches that the field 
practices.  If we assume that parameter x can contain all possible elements xi that correspond 
to different “explanations” of some psychological phenomenon, then n(x) that psychological 
scientists could potentially develop is relatively large, and although we do not known its 
exact value we can state that it tends toward infinity.  Despite this, psychological 
conventions, trends, and practices prevent psychologists from continuously realizing (i.e. 
inventing or discovering) many different xi, which would increase Hp at a high rate.  Instead, 
they focus on relatively few xi and develop ideas that are related to or belong to these xi until 
changes in conventions, trends, practices, programmes, etc. that allow for the invention of 
other xi occur.  
Solution: Disconnected Academic Psychology 
In this section, I introduce disconnected academic psychology as a solution to the 
knowledge production problem from which current (i.e. connected) psychology suffers. 
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Rather than proposing that disconnected psychology should replace connected psychology, I 
argue that psychological knowledge production can be maximized only if these two streams 
coexist.  I start with defining disconnected psychology by contrasting it with connected 
psychology, and then I discuss how the former overcomes some of the problems that the 
latter suffers from and why psychological knowledge production would be maximized under 
the existence of both streams.  
As can be seen from Table 1, both connected and disconnected psychology are 
grounded upon the main foundations of psychological method—observability and non-
accidentality—because psychological method is what defines psychological science, and 
without it psychology cannot be a science (Cohen, 1977; Feyerabend, 1975; Koch, 1981; 
Popper, 1959, 1963; Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1989; Shrout & Rodgers, 2018).  However, how 
this method is practiced differs between the two streams.  In connected psychology, scholars 
need to connect their work to other work that has been done in the discipline (e.g. their 
domain of research or other domains of research); their application of psychological method 
needs to be informed by previous work in the discipline; they need to follow certain reporting 
and writing conventions, etc.  By being connected to a field consisting of other psychologists 
from their domain of research or more broadly, a psychological scientist to some degree 
operates according to the field’s norms, conventions, trends, or principles.   
In contrast, in disconnected psychology, there is no attempt to connect the work of 
different psychologists.  The only requirement is that they ground their work upon 
psychological method, but how they interpret and develop this method is up to them.  Their 
work evolves in line with their own experiences, observations, past ideas, etc., and not in 
relation to other psychologists and the conventions, epistemology, or assumptions these 
psychologists share.  Overall, it can be said that in disconnected psychology a psychologist 
himself/herself is a field, s/he establishes one’s own norms, conventions, and principles over 
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time, and s/he may develop one or more research agendas or programmes across one’s 
lifetime.  A critic may object that disconnected psychology cannot be classified as 
psychological science.  However, if psychological method is what defines psychology as a 
science, then whoever adheres to this method is a psychological scientist, even if one chooses 
to do this without connecting to a field consisting of other psychological scientists and 
adhering to norms and principles that emerged among them (i.e. without adhering to 
connected psychology).  Adherence to norms, rules, principles, or conventions cannot 
constitute psychological science because no one can objectively prove that some specific 
norms or conventions that emerged within the field can lead to greater discoveries via 
psychological method than some other possible existing principles that a psychologist can 
develop individually or that may have emerged in the field under other circumstances.  
In relation to dividing psychology into connected and disconnected, it is important to 
understand that, when referring to current psychology as connected, I do not imply that all 
research findings are perfectly connected and it is clear how they are theoretically related to 
each other.  In that sense, the term “connected” should not be taken too literally.  Indeed, I 
have argued that the field metaphorically resembles a “sea” of different findings and 
approaches whose constantly fluctuating degree of connectedness (or lack of it) may depend 
on the research domains to which they belong and on various other factors (e.g. Feyerabend, 
1975; Haslam & Lusher, 2011).  By referring to psychology as connected, I posit that 
connectedness is inherent to the field given that, for published research findings, it is of 
crucial importance to explain how they are linked to other relevant research and contribute to 
it (e.g. Safer & Tang, 2009); that it is generally expected that psychologists develop their 
research and ideas by drawing on the work of other contemporary and preceding 
psychological scientists (e.g. Adair & Vohra, 2003; Sigal & Pettit, 2012); that psychologists, 
regardless of their research domain, are broadly connected via the referencing styles and 
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other reporting conventions that prompt shared epistemological underpinnings (e.g. Budge & 
Katz, 1995; Madigan et al., 1995); that groups of psychologists may be connected via 
research programmes, domains, or agendas (Lakatos, 1970), and so on.   
In contrast, in disconnected psychology, all these aspects of connectedness are avoided.  
Psychologists do not draw on the work of other contemporary and preceding psychologists 
and do not attempt to link their work to certain domains of research via referencing; they do 
not share reporting styles or conventions; they are not connected via shared research 
programmes or agendas, etc.  It could be said that disconnected psychology slightly 
resembles the field of psychology in its early days, when psychologists were generally forced 
to work more independently because information could not be easily shared and they were 
therefore more impacted by their immediate environments and life circumstances (Leahey, 
1987, 1994).  Of course, considering that we currently live in the information age, even if 
disconnected psychologists would be deliberately disconnected from psychology as a field, 
they would be exposed to an immense amount of information from their immediate 
environment and from across the world.  
The question is how disconnected psychology overcomes the problems related to 
knowledge production from which connected psychology suffers.  The first problem I 
identified is that connected psychology fails to maximize the likelihood of discovering some 
xi with the highest possible probability (e.g. xu) because various conventions, trends, and 
practices of the field (e.g. APA style, referencing, impact of highly influential scientists on 
the discipline, etc.) lead psychologists to focus on a relatively narrow subset of x and to 
predominantly work on relatively few similar xi instead of maximizing the diversity of 
theories, methodologies, and approaches.  Next to increasing the possibility of attaining xu 
and therefore producing Hf of lowest magnitude, larger diversity of theories, methodologies, 
and approaches directly corresponds to larger n(x).  Hence, increasing this diversity also 
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resolves the second problem I identified, which is that connected psychology restricts n(x) 
and in doing so limits the magnitude of Hp.    
Therefore, to overcome the problems linked to connected psychology, disconnected 
psychology needs to increase the diversity of theories, methodologies, approaches, etc.  One 
potential argument against the premise that disconnected psychology would indeed achieve 
this goal is that, without following the work of each other and what has previously been 
achieved in the discipline, disconnected psychologists would simply repeat each other as well 
as connected psychologists and keep reinventing the wheel.  Whereas repetitions would 
undoubtedly happen, as they happen even in connected psychology where different scientists 
tend to propose similar concepts under different names (e.g. priming and anchoring; Strack & 
Mussweiler, 1997), I offer several arguments justifying why disconnected psychology should 
nevertheless increase the diversity of theories, methodologies, approaches, etc.3 
All psychological scientists are exposed to a unique set of an immense number of life 
circumstances (e.g. their childhood, education, culture, everyday events, friends, other 
influences, etc.) that in interaction with their individual differences (e.g. genetics, personality, 
etc.) shape their thoughts and actions.  Without some guiding principles such as rules, norms, 
and conventions of the field that would regulate their use of psychological method, it would 
be difficult to expect that they would develop exactly the same ideas, concepts, and 
terminology that would guide their theories, methodologies, and approaches.  In addition to 
the individual characteristics and life circumstances that would shape their work, their recent 
ideas would continuously be influenced by their previous ideas, which would result in a body 
of work that, at the end of their careers, would be a unique consequence of the interaction 
between all these influences and psychological method.  Overall, psychologists have already 
discussed that various constraints that the field imposes on its members may restrict diversity 
of approaches and ideas (e.g. Medin et al., 2017).  Disconnected psychology can be seen as a 
UNBURDENING THE SHOULDERS OF GIANTS 20 
 
more extreme extension of this notion, according to which completely removing any 
constraints by disconnecting psychologists from the “field” would allow the immense number 
of circumstances present in the world to shape their work, which would over time result in 
unique theories, methodologies, approaches, etc. for each psychological scientist.  
Although no definite evidence can back up this claim because there are few if any 
examples of scientists who developed their ideas according to the principles of disconnected 
psychology, there are certain events and research findings on which I will rely to defend it.  
For example, we know that there are roughly 6,000-8,000 languages that evolved over the 
course of human history, and these languages are generally diverse and “vary radically in 
sound, meaning, and syntactic organization” (Evans & Levinson, 2009, p. 429).  This 
language diversity may have been caused by a gradual accumulation of random changes over 
time in combination with the need to adapt to different environments in which the languages 
evolved (Lupyan & Dale, 2016).  Similarly, over the course of human history, an immense 
number of cultural traditions and norms have evolved in different geographic areas 
(UNESCO, 2009), and this cultural diversity may in fact be one of the factors that influenced 
language diversity (Dunn, Greenhill, Levinson, & Gray, 2011).  Cultures and languages 
generally evolved during periods of human history void of modern communication and 
information systems, which means that humans could not easily share information unless 
they were in geographical proximity (Harari, 2014).  Therefore, cultural and language 
diversity indicates that unique sets of circumstances that operate in different environments 
that are not connected to the same “field” that imposes certain conventions, norms, rules, etc., 
will give rise to unique intellectual creations.  Here I am not claiming that individual 
psychologists who are disconnected from the field can be exactly equated to groups of 
geographically disconnected generations of people who developed different languages and 
cultural traditions.  However, the basic notion that, in the absence of norms and rules 
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prescribed by some overarching field, different circumstances and environments would give 
rise to diverse ideas and approaches should also apply to disconnected psychologists over the 
course of their lifetime. 
Another indication that disconnected psychology may lead to diversity of ideas is that 
original and transformative scientific contributions were in many cases made by “outsiders” 
who, although not disconnected from their fields in the sense that disconnected psychology 
advocates, were operating outside of typical confines of these fields.  Given that there seem 
to be no exact statistical information in this regard I will start by giving some examples.  
Albert Einstein, who created one of the most influential theories of all time (relativity), was 
working as a patent clerk at the time when he developed some of his most important ideas 
(Pais, 1982).  Said Carnot, who originated the second law of thermodynamics, was a military 
engineer and spent his life working for the military (Erlichson, 1999).  Julian Jaynes, who 
wrote one of the most original psychology books—The origin of consciousness in the 
breakdown of the bicameral mind (Jaynes, 1976)—also did not have a typical academic 
career, and despite giving lectures at many universities he was not interested in tenure.  In 
general, science seems to evolve when outsiders who do not work with dominant figures in 
their field manage to introduce their ideas into the field, which in many cases happens after 
the death of these dominant figures who may, for different reasons, impede the acceptance of 
new ideas (Azoulay et al., 2019). 
There are also several other anecdotal lines of evidence that may to some extent support 
my argument regarding disconnected psychology and are linked to the exploration of 
different hypothesis or theory spaces during evidence-based searches.  From the Bayesian 
perspective, this reduces to optimizing Bayesian model selection and inherent structure 
learning through a search on model space (Tervo, Tenenbaum, & Gershman, 2016).  Perhaps 
the clearest example of this is evolution, where natural selection becomes Bayesian model 
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selection (Campbell, 2016).  In this setting, each phenotype represents a different theory or 
hypothesis for what kind of creatures are best suited to a given eco-niche.  In this regard, 
diversity plays a key role—and the arguments in this paper are essentially akin to those that 
underwrite speciation and co-evolution.  Similar kinds of mechanics are found in machine 
learning and engineering.  In this instance, random explorations of hypothesis spaces are 
implicit in procedures like stochastic optimal control and Bayesian filters (e.g., particle 
filters).  These structural approaches to optimizing models are based upon model evidence 
(Friston, 2010; Friston, 2013), which may be a principle that underlies not just psychological 
enquiry but also the very existence of psychologists. 
Finally, now that I have addressed why disconnected psychology overcomes some of 
the problems of connected psychology, it is necessary to discuss why psychological 
knowledge production can be maximized only if these two streams coexist.  First, for 
knowledge (K) to be created, some knowledge-producing event (which in psychology may 
correspond to a single research study or a set of many research studies) that will lead to Hf 
needs to occur.  Disconnected psychology itself cannot generate a knowledge-producing 
event (e.g. it cannot produce studies that would test many different theories) because 
disconnected psychologists develop their own work but do not try to connect it to the work of 
other psychologists.  Therefore, connected psychology would be responsible for generating 
knowledge producing events that involve testing explanations of psychological phenomena 
produced by many different disconnected and connected psychologists.  Moreover, given that 
the two streams of psychology operate according to different principles, the diversity of 
theories, methodologies, and approaches that corresponds to n(x) should be largest across 
these streams together rather than in isolation.  In other words, this means that n(x) can be 
maximized when different instances of x from both fields are combined, which can therefore 
potentially lead to largest possible Hp.   
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Conclusion 
The present article argues that connected psychology, in which psychological scientists 
build upon each other’s work and are connected into a “field”, restricts the amount of 
psychological knowledge produced due to various norms, conventions, and rules that reduce 
the diversity of theories, methods, and approaches.  To overcome this problem, I propose 
disconnected psychology in which psychological scientists ground their work upon 
psychological method but are disconnected from a “field” that comprises other psychologists.  
I posit that the production of psychological knowledge can be maximized only if connected 
and disconnected psychology coexist.  In this regard, the role of connected psychology would 
be to continue operating in the same way that it currently does, but also to constantly browse 
theories, methodologies, and approaches developed by disconnected psychologists so that it 
can continuously test them in combination with theories, methodologies, and approaches 
from connected psychology and determine the ones that best explain psychological 
phenomena of interest.  This may be a challenge given that disconnected psychologists may 
use different reporting styles and terminologies in their work.  However, considering recent 
advancements in AI concerning exploration of scientific literature and data (Extance, 2018), 
the time may be ripe for disconnected psychology to arise and enrich psychological 
knowledge in combination with connected psychology.     
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Footnotes 
1
 According to APA: “Psychology is the study of the mind and behavior.  In every 
conceivable setting from scientific research centers to mental healthcare services, "the 
understanding of behavior" is the enterprise of psychologists.” (Retrieved from 
https://www.apa.org/support/about-apa); According to BPS: “Psychology is the scientific 
study of the mind and how it dictates and influences our behavior, from communication and 
memory to thought and emotion.” (Retrieved from https://www.bps.org.uk/public/what-is-
psychology).  
2
 If we computed Hf for many different K quantities, with each K pertaining to a different 
psychological phenomenon, or to a set of different psychological phenomena, a highly 
successful theory xi would have highest 𝑝(𝑥𝑖) in each of these cases, which would mean that 
it offers the best prediction of many different research findings constituting the knowledge-
producing event, and it therefore most successfully connects these findings.  A unified theory 
xi would lead to Hf = 0 for any possible K referring to some psychological phenomenon, 
which indicates a complete certainty that, out of all examined theories, this theory most 
accurately predicts the circumstances under which this phenomenon will occur and also 
implies that the theory produces highest possible K for some n(x).  
3
 It is, however, important to emphasize that even the repetitions to which I refer would 
constitute a valuable contribution to psychological science.  For example, if two scientists 
from the same unit confirm each other's hypotheses, this is much less compelling than the 
"convergent evolution" to the same constructs from scientists who have never communicated 
to each other.  
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Table 1 
Main Principles of Connected and Disconnected Academic Psychology 
Principle Connected Psychology Disconnected Psychology 
1 Grounded upon observability and non-
accidentality as the foundations of 
psychological method.  
Grounded upon observability and non-
accidentality as the foundations of 
psychological method. 
2 Psychologists “stand on the shoulders 
of giants”—it is a requirement to refer 
to previous literature in the field and 
connect one’s theories and research to 
previous literature.  
Psychologists “do not stand on 
anyone’s shoulders”—they develop 
their ideas by relying solely on 
observability and non-accidentality 
without following the work of other 
psychologists. They continuously 
build upon their own previous work; 
referencing is used but in relation to 
one’s own previous work.   
3 Psychologists follow certain widely 
accepted reporting and referencing 
guidelines (e.g. APA style).  
Psychologists use their own reporting 
and referencing styles that best suit 
their work.  
4 Psychologists are “connected” to a 
field consisting of other psychologists. 
They understand the conventions of 
their respective research domains 
and/or the field more generally and 
may to some degree operate according 
to the shared norms, beliefs, or trends; 
they are members of various 
psychological organizations and/or 
research groups, etc. 
Psychologists are “disconnected” from 
a field consisting of other 
psychologists. They are not aware of 
the conventions of connected 
psychology and instead form their 
own conventions, norms, and 
principles over time; they are not 
members of various psychological 
organizations and/or research groups, 
etc. 
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Figure 1.  The relationship between n(x), which corresponds to the number of different 
instances of x ranging from {x1,…,x100} in this example, and Hp, which corresponds to 
maximum possible entropy prior. When entropy final (Hf) equals 0, the amount of maximum 
possible knowledge produced (K) for some x corresponds to the value of maximum possible 
Hp that is determined by n(x).  Maximum possible Hp values in the graph are expressed in 
bits.  
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